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Beyond the Bylaws: Hospital-Physician
Relationships, Economics, and Conflicting
Agendas
JOHN D. BLUMt
People should think things out fresh and not just accept
conventional terms and the conventional way of way of doing
things.
R. Buckminster Fuller1
In 2003 the Seattle based retailer, Nordstrom, opened a
new store on Chicago's trendy North Michigan Avenue.
Unlike the department stores of old that carried a vast
array of consumer goods, the new Nordstrom is a large shoe
store, accompanied by a number of small cosmetic and
clothing departments. 2 The Michigan Avenue Nordstrom is
one small example of how the retail industry has been, and
continues to be, shaped by various external forces in the
consumer marketplace. While hospitals, with their unique
blend of human resources, technologies, services and
products, are far more complex organizations than
department stores, they share a commonality in as much as
they too have been profoundly impacted by market forces,
which have shaped their structures and operations. Even a
cursory examination of hospitals in the last twenty-five
years demonstrates that the acute care facility of the early
twenty-first century, like a department store, is contained
t John J. Waldron Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
This article is dedicated to the memory of my father, Dr. Robert Blum,
President, Buffalo General Hospital medical staff, 1976, graduate, U.B. Medical
School, 1942.
1. R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, SYNERGETICS (1975).
2. See James L. Swanson, As Nordstrom Carves Its Niche, What's In It For
You, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 2000, at C6.
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in a far different structure than the hospital model which
emerged post-World War II. Not only have hospitals
undergone dramatic internal changes, but since the 1970s
they have been moving services out of inpatient settings
and have developed a wide array of affiliated, focused,
outpatient service delivery programs. Unlike retail
establishments, however, the structural evolution of
hospitals driven by external markets is complicated by the
presence of regulation, which paradoxically both sparks and
impedes change. Unquestionably market forces, and in
some cases regulations, have been catalysts for reshaping
the structure of the American hospital. But to a large
extent the regulatory system has been a major factor in
protecting the structures of hospitals, retaining structural
elements in the face of market forces, which, unchecked,
may have even further eroded core features of the hospital.
From a legal standpoint, the corporate structure of
hospitals, best typified by its tripartite arrangement of
board, medical staff, and administration, has remained a
constant in the midst of the evolving complexities in acute
care facilities. It is the contention of this article that the
permanence in the corporate structure of hospitals,
reflected in the tripartite arrangement is only a veneer
under which profound changes are occurring,
demonstrating that even the core features of general
hospitals are being altered by market forces. In particular,
the manner in which physicians relate to hospitals is
changing, and even amid current battles to solidify the
power of the medical staff, the structure in which that
entity exists is eroding. The purpose of this article is to
explore the evolution of the hospital-physician relationship
in the context of community hospitals. The article will
briefly examine the changing marketplace within which
hospitals and doctors function, demonstrating that
competitive pressures are both altering and complicating
the relationship of these two parties. A significant portion
of the discussion will focus on the changing nature of
credentialing disputes as an area that mirrors the external
pressures in the health delivery environment. The article
will point out that current credentialing disputes, that
combine quality and cost considerations, are often just a
pretext for airing larger issues over the respective roles of
the involved parties, and frequently touch on broader
matters of autonomy and governance. The article will
[Vol. 53460
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conclude with some suggestions as to how the relationships
between community hospitals and medical staff members
can be recalibrated to better reflect current marketplace
realities.
BACKGROUND
In recent years the landscape of the American hospital
has been profoundly altered by two primary factors,
regulation, and more recently, marketplace competition.
3
On the regulatory side, hospitals have been the ongoing
subjects of a vast array of local, state, and federal
mandates, which touch on virtually all aspects of
operations. Historically, hospital regulation is rooted in
state licensure laws, and it is these laws that contain the
key structural components that must be present in hospital
corporations. 4 The basic tripartite structure of hospitals,
board, medical staff, and administration has been
universally incorporated into state licensure laws, as well
as a detailed delineation of the scope of departments and
services which must be present in the acute care facility.
Licensure laws act as an ongoing vehicle to alter and/or
expand hospital obligations, and tend to be the first forum
in which legal changes are made to address such problems
as emergency care or patient safety. On the federal side,
Medicare, in particular, has become a key element in
shaping hospital operations. The Medicare Conditions of
Participation, which act as an entree vehicle into the
program, parallel hospital licensure requirements,
requiring similar elements such as the basic tripartite
structure. 5 The most significant impact of Medicare on
hospitals is felt in reimbursement policies that have acted
both to promote, alter and end operational practices,
touching on all matters of the institution's business. A key
example of the impact of Medicare reimbursement policy
can be seen in the adoption of a prospective payment
system via Diagnostic Related Groupings (DRGs) in the
1980s which had a profound effect not only on direct
3. See REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET DRIVEN HEALTH CARE 221-28 (1997).
4. A good example of the nature and scope of hospital licensure laws can be
found in the following three state statutes, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1005
(2004), HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-14.5 (2004), 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/6 (2004).
5. 42 C.F.R. § 482.1 (2005).
4612005]
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reimbursement, but on patient care utilization generally.6
Also in the Medicare context, the area of fraud and abuse
enforcement, and the related institutional efforts in
corporate compliance, have become major areas of focus in
the ongoing efforts by institutions to devise a whole range
of internal and external business strategies. 7 Beyond
Medicare there are numerous examples of how federal law
has shaped hospitals either through application and
enforcement of federal schemes such as antitrust law or via
an ongoing proliferation of new legislative initiatives such
as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
or more recently the medical information regulations
devised under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.8 Tax law has always been a core concern
for the hospital industry, and the current debate about the
community benefit requirements of nonprofit hospitals has
caused considerable refocusing on the obligations of
501(c)(3) acute care corporations. 9  Not only does
government regulation impact the structure and operations
of hospitals, but also in this sector, private regulation,
particularly that spawned by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), plays
a very significant role. 10 For many years JCAHO (formerly
JCAH) has had an active hospital accreditation program,
which, like licensure and the Medicare Conditions of
Participation, mandates a series of structural and
operational policies which hospitals must comply with.
JCAHO standards have been altered significantly over
time, but the core structure of the hospital (board,
administration, and medical staff) around which the
standards are centered, continues to be the model in use."
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988).
7. While there are several federal laws that concern Medicare and Medicaid
fraud and abuse enforcement, three laws stand out as being of primary note,
the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (2000), the
so-called Stark Laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (2000), 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn(h)(6), and the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2000).
8. Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000),
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1996).
9. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
10. See HosP. ACCREDITATION STANDARDS (Joint Commission on




The JCAHO standards are particularly important because
compliance with them allows a hospital to participate in
Medicare under the principle of "deemed status," thus
avoiding an independent government survey process
required for program participation.
12
The context within which hospital regulations are
applied has changed dramatically since the 1970s.
Hospitals in the early part of the twenty-first century have
evolved from community service entities that were quasi-
public in nature to health care delivery businesses,
competing in increasingly competitive markets. Starting in
the 1980s the hospital world experienced dramatic changes
ushered in by the convergence of a number of regulatory
and related business realities. As noted, a significant
catalyst for change was the adoption of a Prospective
Payment System (PPS) via Diagnostic Related Grouping
(DRG) categories that resulted in a major alteration in the
financing and delivery of medical care. 13 After years of
expansion and high occupancy rates, hospitals, as a result
of PPS, were motivated to introduce operational efficiencies
that reduced lengths of stay, cut down on diagnostic tests,
limited treatment to uninsured and underinsured patients,
and forced institutions to be more aggressive in billing and
collection practices. The system also favored admission of
patients with high DRG payments such as surgery and
endoscopy. In turn, as inpatient occupancy rates fell,
hospitals were forced to engage in marketing and look for
new ways to attract patients that frequently involved
opening various types of ambulatory treatment centers (i.e.,
ambulatory surgical treatment centers, urgent care centers,
renal dialysis centers, birthing centers), which became
popular with managed care payers. 14 The changes in the
acute care sector sparked increased competition, which
pushed nonprofit hospitals into capital markets to finance
technology, supplies, and human resources needed to be
competitive. 15 In addition, the growing costs of regulatory
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (Supp. V 1993); 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.12, 482.22 (2005).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2000).
14. See Melvin Horwitz, Corporate Reorganization: The Last Gasp or Last
Clear Chance for the Taw-Exempt, Nonprofit Hospital?, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 527,
539 (1988).
15. See id. at 540.
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compliance, aggressive external peer review, unionization,
increased consumer demand, and stricter scrutiny over
costs and operations by purchasers were other factors that
combined to change the nature of the hospital enterprise in
the 1980s. Currently hospitals face major workforce
shortage pressures, increased medical liability costs,
heightened public accountability on both the public and
private sides, as well as increased legal scrutiny. 16
To cope with the realities of financing and regulation,
many nonprofit hospitals reorganized their corporate
structures in the hope that organizational flexibility would
result in opportunities to pursue new ventures, garner
additional income, and attract patients and physicians
alike. While a variety of corporate models were used, the
most typical reorganization entailed the adoption of the
nonprofit parent holding company that would oversee both
nonprofit and for-profit subsidiaries, including the hospital
corporation. 17 The parent and subsidiaries may be involved
in activities that would normally be regulated if pursued
through the traditional single hospital corporate model. In
tandem with internal reorganization, a variety of external
corporate arrangements evolved including affiliations,
alliances, mergers, and even the creation of hospital
systems. A number of hospitals entered into joint ventures
with members of their medical staffs to create Physician
Hospital Organizations (PHOs) that were used as vehicles
to attract managed care plans to enter into agreements
with institutions for the provision of physician services. The
most ambitious external hospital model entailed the
creation of integrated delivery systems, which attempted to
link together a spectrum of acute care services with other
types of institutional providers and health programs, as
well as physician groups. 18 While over time the internal
organizations and external alignments of individual
hospitals often changed due to regulatory and market
pressures, the structural templates spawned in the 1980s
still characterize the present acute care sector.
16. See American Hospital Association, The State of Hospitals'Financial
Health, available at http://www.aha.org/aha/advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/
advocacy/content/Wp2002HospFinances.doc (last visited May 18, 2005).
17. See HORWITZ, supra note 14, at 545-47.
18. See Jeffrey M. Teske, Second-generation legal issues in integrated
delivery systems, 49 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 54 (Jan. 1995).
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EXPLORING THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE
It is a curious anomaly that in the midst of so much
fundamental change in the internal and external
environments of hospital operations, the core corporate
legal structure of hospitals, board, medical staff, and
administration, has remained intact. The fact is, however,
that although the tripartite structure has been retained,
the dynamics of how the three parts of the hospital
structure relate to each other has been altered by many of
the changes noted in the background discussion. In
practical terms, the tripartite arrangement can be best
thought of as a bifurcated structure with the medical staff
being a distinct entity and board-administration viewed as
unified pieces. More recently, focus has been placed on the
role of the board as a distinct, independent entity within
the hospital, sparked by concerns over trustee
responsibilities in the for-profit sector triggered by the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, as well as by a
growing need of board members to be more engaged in
business matters in competitive marketplaces. 19
Within the hospital tripartite, the medical staff is
clearly the most unique part as its status is that of a self-
governing, independent, unincorporated association
contained within the overall corporate structure. There does
not appear to be any one distinct event which triggered the
concept of the independent medical staff, but rather three
related factors can be identified that have converged to
spark this unique arrangement. One factor that has
influenced the independent medical staff is the long-
standing doctrine of the corporate practice of medicine. The
corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibits a lay
corporation from providing medical services. 20 The logic
underpinning the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is
that only those trained and licensed as physicians should be
19. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2003). While Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply to
nonprofit boards, more and more legal commentators in the health law area are
arguing that boards in the hospital world should act in accordance with the
governing principles delineated in this law. For example, see Ashby Jones, Pre-
emptive Actions Seen at Non-Profits, 26 NAT'L L.J. 8 (2005).
20. See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine




able to oversee the delivery of medical care. While the
importance of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
has waned over time, the rationale supporting the doctrine
parallels the logic that requires an independent medical
staff to exert control over matters touching on the provision
of medical care within the institution. The second factor
which supports the independent, self-governing medical
staff, is common law case precedent, starting in 1965 with
the Illinois Supreme Court decision of Darling v. Charleston
Community Hospital.21 Under Darling and its progeny,
hospitals have been required to assume legal responsibility
for the quality of the medical care provided in the
institution, a mandate that requires physician engagement
as lay administrators and board members lack expertise in
this area. The quality function extends beyond monitoring
into areas touching on institutional/medical practice
policies and procedures that must be crafted by physicians
in the hospital, thus providing a broad and distinct
institutional role that, in a sense, removes the medical staff
from general corporate control. Thirdly, the medical staff
has traditionally been composed of independent contractors,
who, not being employees of the hospital, safeguarded their
autonomy through a structure that provides them with a
collective voice, carves out unique professional and
institutional roles, and safeguards physicians collectively
from being treated as members of a corporate department.
The self-governing medical staff has been recognized as a
type of unincorporated association, and as part of its self-
governance structure, staffs have developed their own
bylaws, separate from the overall institutional bylaws,
which detail structures and functions of this entity.22 This
rather unusual arrangement that makes the medical staff
separate, but a part of the hospital corporate structure, has
been recognized in law as well as in the standards of the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO).23 While there is a mutual
21. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
22. See The California Medical Association, Legal Counsel, Document #
1280, Medical Staff Self-Governance: Policy and Law, (Jan. 2004) at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/ pg/cpr/docslunch-oncall.pdf (last visited April
11, 2005). See also, Howard Lang, Why Self Government, at
http://www.medspectrum.com/ selfgovernance.pdf (last visited April 13, 2005).
23. See HosP. ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra note 10 at M.S.1.10.
[Vol. 5 3466
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dependency binding the three elements of the hospital
tripartite structure together, the distinctiveness of the
medical staff structure has created strains within the
hospital, and has resulted in a very strong sense of
independence on the part of physicians that often exceeds
the legal support for this model.
CREDENTIALING AS A BACKDROP TO PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
RELATIONS
One window into the dynamics of the relationships
between hospital administration/boards and medical staffs
can be found in the credentialing process. Credentialing,
the appointment, reappointment and delineation of clinical
privileges, is a long-standing legal responsibility of
hospitals that fits within the general ambit of quality, and
is perhaps the most visible manifestation of the broader
quality mandate. 24 Credentialing, as noted recently by the
Supreme Court of Texas, is a continuing hospital obligation
that is not just a discrete series of processes, but rather
constitutes an ongoing mandate to monitor and assess
physician competence within the institution.25 While the
credentialing process entails collection and verification of
routine background information, the evaluation component
of credentialing involves an assessment of a physician s
practice that necessitates professional input. Legally,
credentialing decisions are ones made by the hospital
board, but in practice the credentialing function has been
delegated to the medical staff, who through its committee
structure conducts necessary evaluations and makes
recommendations in the area. The law has recognized
credentialing as a delegated function, and the process is so
ingrained in the medical staff world that rarely would a
hospital board differ from the staff recommendations, for to
do so is to spark an inevitable controversy, and possible
lawsuit. 26
24. See Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2004).
25. See id.
26. See J. STUART SHOWALTER, SOUTHWICK'S THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE
ADMINISTRATION 439-40 (4th ed. 2004); see also Phillip L. Merkel, Physicians
Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff Peer Review Law at
California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 301 (2003-2004).
2005] 467
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Traditional credentialing controversies entail situations
in which individual physicians who have been adversely
affected by a particular decision challenge that decision as
being in violation of law. Typically, physicians who are
denied medical staff membership, removed from the staff,
or have practice privileges restricted, face such
consequences because of concerns by credentialing
committees over quality of care matters. The types of
quality matters at issue in adverse credentialing can range
from administrative violations such as failure to complete
medical records in a timely fashion and patient
abandonment, to concerns over patterns of substandard
care, serious lapses in patient care, conduct endangering
patient safety, or concerns over chemical dependency.
27
Physicians who challenge credentialing decisions are locked
into an administrative process delineated in hospital and
medical staff bylaws in which the complainant must
proceed through a lengthy and complex web of procedures.
Those who persist with credentialing claims can pursue
their remedies in courts where over time a number of
theories have been argued from breach of contract, to
violation of due process, to allegations of statutory
violations. 28  Interestingly enough, the most typical
challenge in physician credentialing tends to be a breach of
contract action, rooted in allegations of a hospital's failure
to follow established policies, and many courts have
recognized hospital and medical staff bylaws as having
contractual import, thus being the foundation for claims of
breach.29
Physician credentialing disputes are a constant in the
world of hospital law as the individual doctor who is
affected by an adverse credentialing decision may suffer
considerable professional damage. From a legal standpoint,
the credentialing area is layered with federal and state law
which mandates reporting of adverse decisions, safeguards
27. See Merkel, supra note 26.
28. See id.
29. For example, see Barrows v. Northwestern Mem'l, 123 Ill.2d 49, 525
N.E.2d 50 (1988), a well known Illinois hospital case which is an excellent
example of the use of a contract theory as the basis for a physician credentialing
dispute. While many state courts have recognized the hospital (and in some
cases medical staff) bylaws as having contractual import, not all do. See Mason
v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 3 N.Y.3d 343, 819 N.E.2d 1029 (2004).
[Vol. 53468
2005] BEYOND THE BYLAWS 469
credentialing committee information from discovery, and
provides conditional immunity for credentialing committee
members. 30 Like most other aspects of hospital operations,
the credentialing area is one that has not been insulated
from change as the internal and external forces affecting
hospitals in recent years have also had an impact on this
process. One very visible change can be found in the nature
of the information upon which credentialing decisions,
particularly privileging decisions, are made. 31 In the 1980s
with the movement to prospective payment systems,
analyses of medical practice shifted, with a greater focus on
individual physician performance, accompanied by data
capabilities, which allowed for examination of practitioner
performance in the aggregate over a discrete period of time.
Portraits of physician performance could be compiled in
profiles that would allow a doctor's performance in dealing
with a given patient diagnosis or in delivering a particular
service to be evaluated. Accompanying changes in
evaluation was the growing national movement in health
services research, which led to the development of clinical
guidelines and protocols as vehicles against which
individual performance could be measured. 32 There is no
data to verify how many credentialing committees used
either physician profiles and/or clinical guidelines as a basis
of their evaluations, but what seems clear, is that the
capability for a more rigorous analysis of physician
practices developed and questions of performance were no
longer strictly based on anecdotal observations.
A thread that has always underlain the physician
credentialing process is economics. Even in the period
before the overt discussions about credentialing and
economics, when presumably quality of care was the only
recognized focal point of medical staff considerations in this
process, financial elements were never totally off the table.
The obvious fact found in the physician credentialing
challenges, noted above, is that while a given case may
30. See Merkel, supra note 26; SHOWALTER, supra note 26; see also Daniel M.
Mulholland, III & Phil Zarone, Waiver of the Peer Review Privilege: A Survey of
the Law, 49 S.D. L. REV. 424 (2003-2004).
31. See Jennifer Daley, Physician Clinical Performance Assessment: The
State of the Art, INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY, MASS. GEN. HoSP. (2002).
32. See Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of
Evidence-Based Medicine, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 18.
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have been sparked by a controversy over quality, the
motivation for such suits stemmed from the physician
plaintiffs desire to protect his/her ability to earn a living. In
California, medical staff disputes have been brought using
the fairness doctrine, which in common law parallels a due
process claim.33 The fairness doctrine is rooted in
employment law, and is one which provides the right to a
fair hearing in cases of termination, recognizing that such a
safeguard is needed in the face of serious economic injury.
The use of the fairness doctrine in the medical staff
credentialing context is a recognition that what is really at
issue in such disputes is a potential, underlying financial
injury. A more direct attestation to the fact that medical
staff credentialing has never been far a field from economic
considerations are cases where aggrieved doctors mount
claims based on state and federal antitrust theories,
arguing that the adverse credentialing actions arose from
restraints of trade, conspiracies or illegal monopolies.
34
While antitrust is not easily applied in the medical staff
context, its application in this area demonstrates the
business realities which underpin the medical staff
credentialing processes.
ECONOMICS ENTERS CREDENTIALING
With changes in the hospital markets and the increase
in competition, which were noted earlier in this article, the
relationship between the hospital and the medical staff
changed. Doctors, individually and collectively, took on a
very clear economic importance to the hospital. While
unquestionably hospitals could never exist without
physicians, the interests of the institution in a competitive
arena go beyond having a medical staff composed of
individuals who perform at acceptable levels of quality, to
having a medical staff that is able to strike the necessary
balance between quality and cost effectiveness. Internally,
acute care facilities were pressed to find, and retain,
clinicians to staff key profit centers, as well as to recruit
physicians whose performance was compatible with the
fiscal goals of the institution. Externally, hospitals needed
33. See Merkel, supra note 26, at 311.
34. See Kurt Erskine, Comment, Square Pegs and Roundholes: Antitrust
Law and the Privileging Decision, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 399 (1995-96).
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to have a medical staff composed of physicians with practice
profiles, which would be attractive to insurers and managed
care plans. In some instances, the purchasers' decisions on
which hospitals to contract with have been totally cost
driven. It was, thus, inevitable that credentialing and
economics were destined to mix in a much more direct way
than what had occurred prior to the dramatic market
changes noted.35
Starting in the late 1980s, the concept of economic
credentialing emerged on the hospital scene. While never
uniformly defined, economic credentialing referred to the
application of fiscal measurements to assess the
appointment, reappointment and grant of clinical
privileges. 36 Unlike traditional credentialing that was
largely rooted in a clinical/quality evaluation of a
physician's background and performance, economic
credentialing was an assessment, which focused on "bottom
line measures" as the arbiter of medical staff membership.
The very fact that economic credentialing emerged as a
concept is reflective of the competitive environment within
which hospitals were operating, and underscores a shift in
attitudes by hospital management and boards as physicians
individually and collectively were seen as akin to economic
units. The "did you, or will you make money for the
hospital" analysis underpinning economic credentialing
sparked considerable controversy in the ranks of organized
medicine.3 7  The process was viewed as both an
inappropriate application of financial standards into an
area that should be rooted only in clinical quality
considerations, as well as an illegal usurpation of the
credentialing function by the lay board. A strong campaign
was waged by organized medicine against economic
credentialing that succeeded in the enactment of legislation
in a number of states, which severely curtailed the
35. See Cindy Reisz, Whatever Happened to Credentialing for Quality,
HEALTH LAW. NEWS, Sept. 2003, at 5.
36. See Beverly Cohen, An Examination of the Right of Hospitals to Engage
in Economic Credentialing, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 705, 706 (2004).
37. See American Medical Association, Economic Credentialing - Issues and
Answers (last updated Mar. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/ category/10919.html; Economic and Exclusive Credentialing;
Exclusive Contracting, LEGAL BRIEF (Ohio State Medical Association, Hilliard,
OH), July 2001 [hereinafter OMA LEGAL BRIEF].
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process. 38 In addition, questions arose about whether
economic credentialing was a type of illegal kickback
requirement in violation of federal law.
39
By and large the economic credentialing controversy
was one that was more political than legal as there is a
dearth of cases specifically litigated on economic
credentialing issues. Perhaps the best known case
concerning economic credentialing was the Florida lower
court opinion of Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Regional
Hospital.40 The court in Rosenblum, a case centering on a
perceived economic conflict of interest, upheld a hospital
board's right not to extend cardiac thoracic surgical
privileges to the plaintiff, despite a recommendation from
the medical staff that such privileges be granted. There was
no question that the plaintiff, Dr. Rosenblum, was a
qualified thoracic surgeon, but the board was concerned
that the plaintiffs position in a competing heart program
could be economically injurious to Tallahassee Regional.
41
The Rosenblum case is noteworthy because the board
decision not to grant privileges was overtly economic, as
there was no underlying, intertwined cost and quality
consideration at issue, as is common in credentialing
disputes. It is also worth noting that the Rosenblum dispute
involved an initial appointment and grant of privileges, for
had the plaintiff been a member of the staff, the board
likely would have been reluctant to reduce privileges
without some nexus to quality, and would also would have
to be concerned about a challenge based on infringement of
a property right.
From a legal standpoint, economic credentialing can be
supported on the grounds, that the hospital board has final
control over credentialing, has the ultimate legal
responsibility for appointing and monitoring medical staff,
38. See Paul Danello, Economic Credentialing: Where Is It Going? (2003),
available at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00989/009358.
Interestingly enough, as noted by Danello, a number of states have actually
passed legislation which allows economic credentialing in some forms to take
place.
39. See id.
40. Final Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant, Rosenblum v.





and has a duty to act as the institutional fiscal fiduciary. No
doubt, counterarguments can be raised that state law and
accreditation supports credentialing as a medical staff
function that cannot be arbitrarily interfered with by a
board, and as a quality process, it should not be corrupted
by use of standards that are not matters fundamentally
rooted in clinical performance. The practical difficulty in
this regard is that quality and cost factors are intertwined,
and quality problems, more often than not, spark financial
considerations. In considering the parameters of the
credentialing function, it is worth turning to state law to
ascertain whether specific guidance can be identified about
what grounds must exist for a board to take actions against
a physician affecting his or her privileges. Under New York
law, four areas can be identified that serve as the basis for
curtailing, diminishing or terminating hospital privileges.
They include factors related to standards of patient care,
patient welfare, character or competency and objectives of
the institution.42 It can be argued in the context of the four
identified grounds for affecting hospital privileges that
institutional objectives might encompass an imperative to
consider economic ramifications, but the other elements
noted are ones rooted in the traditional quality evaluation,
giving pause about how far a board should venture in
taking negative, independent credentialing actions outside
the quality area. In light of the lack of court decisions in the
area, it would appear that hospitals have been very
cautious in pursuing credentialing that did not fit within
the framework of the medical staff's quality analysis. A
recently decided New York case, Mason v. Central Suffolk
Hospital, buttressed the power of the hospital board to
make legitimate credentialing decisions, presumably on all
the grounds noted above, including decisions that meet
institutional objectives. 43 Mason is particularly noteworthy
because the New York Court of Appeals rejected the ability
of a physician to use the hospital bylaws as the basis for a
breach of contract action against the hospital, ruling that
such an action must be based on an explicit agreement
between the plaintiff physician and the hospital.44
42. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b (McKinney 2005).




To an extent, the notion of using fiscal measures to
evaluate physicians for purposes of determining hospital
staff membership and privileges was an issue supplanted
by other developments, but the economic considerations
that sparked the concept are largely still present, giving the
concept continued relevance. In particular, if the current
movement toward pay-for-performance evolves, hospital
administration and medical leadership will be more directly
confronted with the linkage between those physicians
whose practices fall below quality and patient satisfaction
standards and reimbursement. 45 In pay-for-performance,
quality and its implications on cost are directly tied, so it
would seem difficult to keep the awareness of this
relationship from being considered in the credentialing
process. In addition, recent opinions issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services Office of the
Inspector General indicate that hospital programs which
reduce costs through medical care practice standardization
represent efficiencies that do not violate the federal anti-
kickback statute, and so represent another type of behavior
that credentialing might consider.46
BEYOND ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
From an analytical standpoint, credentialing continues
to be a valuable window into the relationship of physicians
and hospitals, but controversies over the influence of
economics in that relationship are no longer rooted only in
traditional quality performance credentialing controversies.
While the term economic credentialing continues to be used,
45. See Deborah Gesensway, ACP's Response to the Pay-For-Performance
Movement, ACP OBSERVER (Jan./Feb. 2004), available at http://www.acponline.
orgljournalslnewslj an-febO4lherald.htm; see also Susan Carhart, Stakeholders
Confront Host of Issues Attendant on Pay for Performance Systems, 14 BNA
HEALTH LAW. REP. 321, 322 (March 10, 2005).
46. The development of joint projects between hospitals and physicians to
improve efficiencies and reduce costs falls into the general area of gainsharing.
On its face gainsharing which rewards physician behaviors may be in violation
of the Federal Anti-Kickback legislation, and has been an area of controversy in
as much as some joint efforts that have legitimate ends may require some type
of reward scheme to succeed. The Department of Health and Human Services
has issued several directives on gainsharing in the form of advisory opinions.
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Off. Inspector Gen. 05-01 to 05-06
(2005), 01-01 (2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/advisoryopinions/
opinions.html.
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the fact is that the concept does not apply to just the use of
fiscal measurements in the appointment and privilege
delineation area. Economic credentialing has become a
catchall concept that represents hospital board decision-
making, based on business considerations, which affects
medical staff autonomy and governance generally. 47 In the
expanded world of economic credentialing, controversies
arise that pit hospital management/boards against medical
staffs where acute care business strategies are at odds with
individual medical practice considerations. While the
credentialing process is often the platform for economic
disputes between the medical staff and hospital, the details
of such disputes are largely ones that fall outside the
bounds of more typical quality evaluation. During the
period in which economic credentialing emerged, the use by
hospitals of physician specialty exclusive contracts, a
practice by which institutions developed exclusive
arrangements for certain services with a particular medical
group, was growing.48 Typically, exclusive contracts cover
hospital-based specialties, such as anesthesiology, radiology
and pathology, but are often used in other areas such as
surgery or emergency room care. The majority of hospitals
have engaged in some type of exclusive contract
arrangement, driven by a desire for greater efficiencies in
core service areas as well as by cost and quality
considerations. 49 Exclusive contracts do not negate the need
for involved physicians to be credentialed, but in a sense
add another dimension to the issue of medical staff
evaluation, which falls outside the purview of the medical
staff. It is common for a physician who enters into an
exclusive contract to have his/her privileges on the staff
linked to the continuation of the contractual agreement. As
such, physician hospital practices in the exclusive
contracting context are not bounded only by quality related
credentialing. Exclusive contracts raise considerations
revolving around operational and financial issues, and such
matters are very much in play in making determinations
about whether to enter into and continue a given
47. See Reisz, supra note 35, at 7.
48. See OMA LEGAL BRIEF, supra note 37.
49. See id.; see also John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing




contractual arrangement with a group of credentialed
doctors. 50 Physician group members in exclusive contract
arrangements reap the economic benefits of such deals, but
the quid pro quo is a change in their relationship to the
contracting hospital, as their livelihoods are tied to both
clinical and financial performance.
The exclusive contracting issue has spilled over into a
number of judicial disputes in which the exclusive contract
in question did not link continuation of the respective
contract with privileges but led to the odd result of a
physician retaining specialty privileges without access to
needed technologies. 51 In litigated exclusive contract cases,
physician plaintiffs have argued that issues concerning
their hospital privileges needed to be evaluated under the
medical staff bylaws. While the courts have generally
agreed with the need to invoke fair hearing rights when
continuation of contracts and privileges are not linked,
there is also a general recognition in these cases of a
hospital board's authority to enter into exclusive
contractual arrangements, as part of its mandate to
improve institution efficiencies. 52  Unquestionably,
physician exclusive contracts alter traditional credentialing
in that they add another element to the hospital based
practice of medicine, outside considerations expressed in
the medical staff bylaws. Joining privilege retention with
contract continuation may not inherently alter the quality
related criteria of credentialing, but its impact is to add a
distinct business component to staffing issues, removing the
exclusivity of medical staff decision-making in the physician
assessment area.
Another strategy pursued by administration and boards
to enhance institutional efficiency, and to retain physicians
on staff, is to close medical staff membership, in whole or in
part. As medical staff membership, outside of some public
50. See Blum, supra note 49, at 181-82.
51. See, e.g., Lewisburg Cmty. Hosp. Inc. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756
(Tenn. 1991).
52. See Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2001); see also
Client Memorandum from Thomas Campbell and John J. D'Attomo, Gardner,
Carton, & Douglas, South Dakota Case Will Be Significant Precedent for
Hospital Governing Boards to Take Economic Factors Into Consideration When




hospitals, is a privilege and not a right, authority to close
staff membership falls within the authority of hospital
trustees. 53 Boards that decide to close medical staff
membership in given medical and surgical areas do so in
recognition of the fact that there is an identifiable need for
a set number of practitioners in given practice areas, and
exceeding a requisite number may result in inefficiencies,
as well as force affected physicians to seek privileges in
several institutions. It is also common to close medical
staffs in certain areas to retain specialists whose practice
viability is eroded by a lack of patient demand stemming
from excess capacity in a particular hospital. 54 Medical
staffs often draft staff development plans, which delineate
strategies for meeting future needs in given practice
areas. 55 While hospital boards may rely on medical staff
plans in making decisions about staff closure, they are
under no legal obligation to do so, and thus the
development plans play only an advisory function. Just as
is the case with exclusive contracting, a board's decision to
close membership in a medical staff on a limited or general
basis erodes medical staff control of such matters, impacts
credentialing, and is another manifestation of the growing
inroads of business considerations in areas once primarily
focused on quality considerations.
Perhaps the best known "economic credentialing" case
in recent years is the decision of the South Dakota Supreme
Court in Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, which concerns a
decision by a hospital board to close medical staff
membership in orthopedic surgery and restrict surgical
privileges in three related areas. 56 The board decision in
Mahan was made to protect the viability of neurosurgical
practice in the hospital, as well as to enhance the
institution's ability to recruit and retain orthopedic
surgeons.5 7 An orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mahan, who had
previously joined the staff of a competing day surgicenter,
53. See Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 160.
54. See id.
55. See American Medical Association, Medical Staff Development Plans -
An Impetus for Young Physician Involvement, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2388.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
56. Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 150.
57. Id. at 152-53.
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sought membership on the staff of Avera St. Luke's, but
was turned down as a result of the hospital policy, and in
turn challenged the board's closure decision. Plaintiff
Mahan argued that the board's decision to close staff
membership in orthopedic surgery violated the medical
staff bylaws, as it was a decision that could only be made by
the medical staff. The South Dakota Supreme Court noted
that the medical staffs authority for monitoring quality and
ensuring the ethical and professional practice of its
members was based on derivative powers granted via the
hospital corporate bylaws and buttressed by state law. 58 As
such, the court characterized the medical staff as an entity
with a very limited range of delegated authority, and the
decision at issue, to close membership in the medical staff,
was seen as a business matter over which the board, and
not the medical staff, had authority. The Mahan decision
painted a very thorough picture of the role of the hospital
board and underscores both the freedom and obligation
hospital trustees have to make good faith decisions to
maintain the economic integrity of the institution.59
Expanding the role of the medical staff into business-
making decisions would require changes in both hospital
corporate bylaws, as well as in state laws and accreditation
policies, and such changes would directly call into question
the established tripartite structure of the hospital.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES
While economic credentialing, exclusive contracting,
and decisions to close membership in medical staffs have all
tested the bounds of the relationship of physicians and
hospitals, each of these areas is reflective of institutional
strategies to use its physician component to enhance fiscal
viability in increasingly competitive markets. While the
friction between the medical staff and the hospital
concerning credentialing persists, another arena sparking
tensions has spawned with the ongoing growth of hospital
sponsored ambulatory care programs. 60 In the struggle to
58. Id. at 155-56.
59. Id. at 160.
60. Greg Piche, Economic Credentialing: Now It Comes To Distances, at
http://www.hollandhart.com/healthcare/2004-0201_archive.htm; see also,
Robert J. Milligan, Plata o Plomo: Hospital Medical Staff Relations in the Era of
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be competitive, maximize reimbursement dollars, and meet
regulatory pressures, hospitals for some time have
developed outpatient services that may alter their
relationships with involved physicians. While hospital
sponsored ambulatory centers are staffed by institutionally
credentialed physicians, such arrangements can spark
disputes over physician selection and can pose direct
competition with certain physician staff members. In a
larger sense, the movement to ambulatory treatment
centers has altered the nature of the hospital business, and
for those affected doctors, changes the nature of their
relationship to the hospital corporation beyond
credentialing to a contractual one, in a manner akin to
exclusive contracts.
Another example of how hospital structures that
evolved as a result of competitive marketplaces alter the
physician relationship to the institution, outside of
traditional credentialing, can be seen in the case of
physician hospital organizations (PHOs).61 The PHO is a
type of joint venture between the hospital and members of
its medical staff that is used as a shell to provide a variety
of medical services, and which is created to attract
contracts from insurers and managed care plans based on
the offered services and panel of physicians. Typically
physicians, usually all members of the same medical staff,
invest in PHOs, and in turn form separate medical groups,
Independent Practice Associations (IPAs), which engage in
credentialing of their members, often using different
criteria from that used in the hospital. As a business
oriented entity, PHO membership is open to physicians
whose practices fit into the respective scheme, and thus not
every credentialed physician in the hospital sponsor may be
attractive to a PHO. While the existence of a PHO entity
does not directly change hospital credentialing, it is an
organization which alters the relationship of its physician
member investors to their hospital partner, binding them
economically to the hospital in a way that medical staff
membership seldom does. Only direct employment or
practice acquisition situations may create a tighter
economic relationship to the hospital than would be the
Conflicts Credentialing, HEALTH LAW. WKLY (Sept. 2004).
61. See Frederick B. Abbey & K. Michael Treash Jr., Reasons Providers
Form PHOs, 49 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 38 (1995).
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case with the PHO, and in such situations the contractual
arrangements with the hospital add another dimension in
practitioner-institutional relationships. Although PHOs and
various other ambulatory service programs complicate the
professional relationships of doctor and hospital, they are
competitive strategies in which physicians voluntarily
participate, induced by economic and professional
opportunities. PHOs tend to be the most visible external
vehicles for bringing together hospitals and a diverse range
of medical staff members, but other partnering vehicles are
developing: for example, the creation by hospitals of
practice institutes in areas such as cardiovascular services
which also entail separate contractual arrangements
outside traditional bylaws. 62
A related set of strategies pursued by hospitals to be
more competitive entails a constant internal alteration of
institutional organizational arrangements, which reflects
longstanding management practices designed to optimize
the effectiveness of an institution through structural
changes. While any reorganization may spark
controversies, a strategy of moving traditional hospital
based departments into outpatient settings for purposes of
competition and reimbursement, as noted, has direct
implications for physician-hospital relationships, and like
exclusive contracts, can result in an excluded medical staff
member being disenfranchised from the institution. The
decision to dismantle long-established elements in the
internal structure of a hospital places the board in an area
of governance that may be necessary in the current
economic climate, but can be seen by staff as an
inappropriate foray into clinical matters. In the Alabama
Supreme Court case of Radiation Therapy Oncology v.
Providence Hospital, a small group of radiation oncologists
challenged a hospital board's decision to transfer radiation
oncology out of the hospital setting in order to consolidate
services in this area.63 The three radiation oncologists
employed by RTO were all members of the Providence
medical staff and had had a contractual relationship with
the hospital to provide services in their specialty area since
62. See Daniel K. Zismer, What Happens Next With Cardiovascular Services
Strategies?, DISCOVERY, July/Aug. 2004, at http://www.dorseyhealthstrategies.
com/grouppubs/2004/discovery_200407-08.asp.
63. No. 1022099, 2005 Ala. LEXIS 10 (Jan.14, 2005).
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the mid 1980s. In the late 1990s, Providence Hospital, with
the assistance of an outside consulting group, reviewed the
institution's oncology program and felt that for quality and
business reasons these services were better provided in an
ambulatory office setting. Specifically, the hospital and its
consultants concluded that the relationship between
medical and radiation oncology was dysfunctional and that
radiation oncology services were complicated by the fact
that RTO operated competing centers, had multiple
employers, failed to use standard treatment protocols, and
had problems with staffing, scheduling, and space usage.
64
In addition, the Providence board decision to consolidate
radiation oncology out of the hospital was motivated by a
change in Medicare reimbursement that favored office-
based services over traditional inpatient settings in this
area. 65 As the medical staff privileges of the RTO physicians
were affected by the relocation of services, the three
physicians were allowed a fair hearing under the dictates of
the medical staff bylaws. The fair hearing panel, composed
of members of the medical staff, concluded from testimony
that the physicians' privileges were improperly infringed
upon. The panel position was based on their interpretation
of the medical staff bylaws which required that adverse
credentialing determinations needed to be based on quality
considerations only. The Providence board, however, relying
on the same hearing testimony, felt that the decision to
consolidate oncology outside the institution was
appropriate, and thus rejected the conclusion of the fair
hearing panel. The RTO physicians sued the hospital,
arguing that the board improperly reduced their privileges
by denying them access to medical equipment and that
their decision failed to be based on the requisite quality
component required in the medical staff bylaws. Similar to
the Mahan decision, the Alabama Supreme Court
characterized the authority of the medical staff as
derivative, and in the credentialing and discipline area,
advisory in nature.66 The court found from the hearing
record that there was substantial support for the decision to
transfer radiation oncology outside the hospital, and that
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id. at *8.
66. Id. at *14.
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the decision was supported by adequate quality
considerations. The RTO court also found that the hospital
board had the power to make business decisions, including
transferring medical services under the institution's
corporate bylaws. 67 In fact, it is arguable from the Alabama
Supreme Court decision that the hospital board has the
necessary power to make operating decisions without
having to ensure that the medical staff fair hearing
measures were invoked. 68 It also seems reasonable to
conclude that most board business decisions which impact
medical services likely will have a strong nexus to either
clinical quality, or to operational efficiency, and thus, can
generally be supported on quality grounds.
PHYSICIAN ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR, CATALYST FOR
CONTROVERSY
While most of the current disputes between physicians
and hospitals that are waged in the credentialing and
governance area concern medical staff reactions against
hospital strategies that are seen as negatively impacting
individual physicians or challenging staff autonomy, the
pendulum in the area is beginning to shift. Considerable
focus has now been directed to a new series of disputes in
which hospitals are reacting to the entrepreneurial
activities of staff physicians. In particular, attention has
been directed to the reaction of hospitals against staff
physicians who are engaged in the formation and delivery
of services in niche provider programs, which may be
competing with a given hospital, siphoning off patients in
lucrative practice areas. 69 Niche provider programs are not
a new phenomenon, but their ongoing, visible proliferation
and the commensurate threat they pose to community
67. Id.
68. See id. at *21-29 (Harwood, J., concurring) (raising the issue of the
board's power to make business decisions without providing a due process
hearing to affected medical staff members).
69. See Business Update: Hospital Study Finds Doctor-Owned Services Draw
From Profits, PHYSICIAN BUSINESS WEEK, March 15, 2005, at 2.; see also John K.
Igelhart, The Emergence of Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals, 352 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 78 (2005); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-167, SPECIALTY
HOSPITALS: GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, SERVICES PROVIDED, AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE (Oct. 2003).
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hospitals has increased. From a governmental perspective,
niche providers are classified as entities in which the
diagnosis of two thirds of their Medicare patients fall into
no more than two major diagnostic related grouping
categories. 70 Typically, niche providers include heart,
orthopedic, and cancer hospitals/clinics, ambulatory surgery
centers, dialysis clinics, and pain, imaging, and
mammography centers; and often such entities are owned
in part by physician specialists who refer to them.
Physician investors are joined by business partners who
provide both capital and management expertise to run
these specialized institutions, with results that have led to
higher profit margins than most general hospitals running
similar services. Beyond profitability, physicians are
attracted to such ventures for several reasons, including
ease of governance through a decrease in bureaucracy,
enhancement of quality in a more controlled setting, and
practice efficiencies. In turn, such niche services meet
consumer demands for convenience and ease of access,
together with optimal outcomes. From the community
hospital perspective, niche providers roil institution-
physician relationships in that specialists involved in the
niche entities generally retain their admitting privileges at
the general hospital, but have an option to channel patients
to the specialty hospitals. 71 The community hospitals see
niche providers as "cream skimmers" that reduce their
patient volume in profitable areas and leave the institution
with the inability to subsidize care in less profitable areas,
as only some state licensure laws place service demands on
specialty hospitals, such as requirements to provide
complete emergency care.
72
In some instances the possibility of a niche provider
opening in a particular market has prompted general
hospitals to counter such a possibility by developing a
hospital sponsored niche entity, together with its physician
specialists. 73 But in some cases, it has been the refusal of
70. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 69.
71. See Igelhart, supra note 69, at 81.
72. See id.; see also American Hospital Association, The Trend Toward
Niche Providers, available at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/annual
meeting/content/03mtgpaperNiche.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
73. See Kelly J. Devers et al., Center for Studying Health System Change,
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general hospitals to partner with specialists that was the
catalyst for a group of physicians to enter into a joint
venture to create a niche entity with an outside party. The
area of specialty hospitals has sparked controversies which
have spilled over into the credentialing area, as hospital
boards have adopted policies which restrict the privileges of
physicians who are investors in competing niche entities. As
the area is evolving, the legal disputes that have arisen are
still winding their way through the courts but have been
matters which have been well-publicized by organized
medicine. 74 A widely reported situation occurred in
Columbus, Ohio, where an eight-hospital system, Ohio
Health, terminated the privileges of seventeen physicians
who had admitted to being investors in a forty-two bed
orthopedic specialty hospital, the New Albany Surgical
Hospital. 75 The system board decided to terminate the
investor physicians' privileges because of their fear that
these specialist investors would "cherry pick" the most
profitable cases, and refer the most costly and least
profitable patients to one of the non-profit system hospitals.
The Ohio Health board was concerned that the loss of
revenue, which they projected at twenty-eight million
dollars per year, would adversely hurt the hospitals'
abilities to provide uncompensated care. 76 Interestingly, it
was the action of the Ohio Health board in converting one of
its hospitals to an outpatient center that had displaced
eighteen surgeons, which provided an incentive for many of
the involved physicians to become investors in the specialty
niche operation. Similar situations have occurred in other
places around the country, where physicians who have
become investors, or active practitioners, in competing
specialty entities have had their privileges removed by
general hospitals who had been, or could be, adversely
affected by the niche provider, based upon a perceived,
Specialty Hospitals: Focused Factories or Cream Skimmers?, Issue Brief No. 62
(April 2003), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/552/552.pdf.
74. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 735-39.
75. See generally Mark Taylor, Doc Investors in For-Profit Hospitals Denied
Staff Privileges; Ohio Not-For-profit System Fear Loss of Market Share to
Specialty Hospitals Owned By Physicians, 32 MOD. HEALTHCARE 12 (July 15,
2002); Mark Taylor, Striking Back at Doc Investors, 34 MOD. HEALTHCARE 10
(Jan. 26, 2004).
76. Taylor, supra note 75.
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measurable economic injury. There has even been
consideration of the antitrust implications of community
hospital behavior when institutions have attempted to
restrict referrals to medical staff members who invest in
niche providers, or use institutional leverage to convince
insurers to refuse to contract with specialty hospitals.
A multiple issue controversy between a hospital board
and medical staff at Community Memorial Hospital of San
Buena Ventura, California, was triggered when the hospital
trustees refused to recognize the election of the medical
staff president because the individual in question, an
orthopedic surgeon, had a financial interest in a competing
niche provider.77 The Community Memorial board action
was taken on the basis of a code of conduct and conflict of
interest policy that required that physicians on staff
acknowledge competing interests, and prevented those
individuals with such interests from holding medical staff
leadership positions which then gave access to confidential
hospital plans. 78 The rejection of the president-elect of the
medical staff due to an economic conflict, while not a
credentialing matter, was seen as an inappropriate,
unilateral decision that challenged the autonomy of the
medical staff, and became the basis for a suit by the staff
against the hospital administration, trustees, and
management company that ran the hospital. The medical
staff lawsuit contained a number of claims beyond the
refusal to accept the election of officers, including
challenges to the unilateral amendment of medical staff
bylaws through adoption of a code of conduct and conflict of
interest policy, as well as failure to consult with the staff
concerning the development of new specialized programs, or
entering into exclusive contracts. Medical staff plaintiffs
argued that the hospital actions constituted unfair business
practices, as well as a breach of the board's fiduciary duty,
77. See Tanya Albert, California Deal Reaffirms Medical Staff Autonomy,
AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 6, 2004, at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004
/09/06/pr120906.htm.
78. See Second Amended Complaint, Medical Staff of Community Hospital
of San Buenaventura v. Community Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura,
No. Civ 219107 (Cal. Super. Ct. Ventura Cty. Sept. 8, 2003). See also James W.
Marks & Jayme R. Matchinski, Conflicts Credentialing: Hospitals and the Use
of Financial Considerations to Make Medical Staffing Decisions, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2005).
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in violation of the medical staff bylaws and state hospital
law.79 The California court dismissed most of the medical
staff allegations ruling that the claims had to be pursued by
individual physicians, but the court did acknowledge that
the medical staff could sue the hospital and its trustees as
an unincorporated entity. The Community Memorial
Hospital case resulted in a settlement between the hospital
and medical staff that guaranteed that the medical staff
bylaws would not be unilaterally changed, and that
conflict/conduct policies be incorporated into the medical
staff bylaws, that board approval of staff officers would not
be unreasonably withheld, that the staff would be allowed
to retain independent counsel and file lawsuits in its own
behalf, that medical staff input be provided on exclusive
contracts, and that the addition of new hospital services be
independently evaluated to determine medical
appropriateness.8 0 The settlement has been seen as a
powerful confirmation of the status of the self-governing
medical staff, and in fact, triggered a political response that
will be noted below. In terms of the struggle between
hospitals and medical staffs over specialty hospitals the
Community Hospital case has had more of a practical than
legal implication, for the settlement places certain
constraints on the hospital-medical staff relationship in the
case of a single institution. But more broadly, the
Community Memorial settlement reflects the broad
tensions surrounding the matter of niche providers,
demonstrates the growing challenges administration/
boards face with medical staffs over conflicting business
strategies, and demonstrates that a hospital, which enters
into a dispute with a medical staff, may jeopardize the
overall viability of the institution.
LEGISLATIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
In credentialing disputes and the more recent
controversies concerning economic evaluation of medical
practices, hospitals have tended to rely on corporate bylaws
and state law to support their respective positions.
79. See Medical Staff of Community Memorial Hospital of San
Buenaventura v. Community Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura, supra
note 78.
80. See Albert, supra note 77.
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Physicians, on the other hand, have argued their cases
based on medical staff bylaws and JCAHO accreditation
standards, and have frequently resorted to the courts to
seek redress from what they perceive as illegal hospital
decisions. Additionally, both medical staffs and hospitals
have sought to use the legislative and administrative
processes to protect their respective interests. Starting with
traditional credentialing, organized medicine has been
successful in lobbying for the incorporation of a series of
protections for medical staff members which have been
supported by state (and to a lesser extent federal) law, as
well as accreditation criteria. 8 ' When economic
credentialing burst onto the scene of hospital-medical staff
affairs in the early 1990s, organized medicine launched a
vigorous campaign opposing the practice, which resulted in
several states enacting legislation restricting the practice.
In addition, the arguments against economic credentialing
raised concerns about whether the practice constituted a
form of an illegal kickback in violation of federal law.
8 2
Interestingly enough, the related practice of exclusive
contracting did not engender as strong an opposition as
economic credentialing from organized medicine in that it is
a practice which splits the ranks of physicians, in that it
rewards certain doctors at the expense of their competitors.
Perhaps the best recent example of the power of the
medical lobby to influence the legislative process to protect
its current position vis-A-vis the hospital can be seen in
California in the reaction to the Community Memorial case
noted above.8 3 The California Medical Association was able
81. Horty, supra note 26.
82. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 748-53; see also Solicitation of Safe Harbor
and Special Fraud Alerts, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,894 (Dec. 9, 2002); see also OIG Draft
Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospital, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,012,
32,023 (June 8, 2004). In the December 9, 2002, Federal Register the OIG
raised several questions about the link between competitive credentialing
practices and the anti-kickback law at the urging of the AMA. See Solicitation of
Safe Harbor and Special Fraud Alerts, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,894 (Dec. 9, 2002). In the
June 8, 2004, Federal Register the OIG advised hospitals to examine
credentialing practices to insure that they don't run afoul of the anti-kickback
statute, cautioning about the adoption of practices which link privileges to a
particular number of referrals or procedures. See OIG Draft Supplemental
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,012.
83. Tom Gilroy & Susan Webster, California Governor Signs Bill Spelling
Out Medical Staff Self-Governance Rights, 13 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1 (Sept. 30,
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to secure passage of SB 1325, which creates a statutory
recognition that the medical staff is an independent
identity, separate from the hospital, and this independent
entity has a right of self-governance, including the right to
sue.8 4 While the governing boards in California hospitals
still retain final authority over the institution, the board
must respect the independence of the medical staff to craft
its own bylaws, and largely relinquish control over
developing standards for credentialing, privileging, and
matters dealing with quality assurance. Although the board
still has the power to approve medical staff bylaws, rules,
and regulations, it cannot unreasonably withhold such
approval, and failings in this area can result in court
intervention in the form of an injunction or writ of mandate
directed against the hospital. While the new California law
is a firm articulation of how medical staffs and boards
should relate to one another, making the medical staff a
legally recognized independent entity with a right to sue is
hardly an artful clarification of this relationship, as it
raises several new issues. 85 For example, if the medical
staff can sue a hospital as an independent entity, in turn
the staff could be sued by the hospital, as well as by outside
parties. In reference to the economic relationships between
physicians and hospitals, it clearly confounds the ability of
institutions to enter into exclusive contracts without
significant input from the medical staff, and calls into
question whether economics can ever be grounds for
exclusion from a medical staff, constraints that may not be
helpful in competitive markets. While much of what is
present in SB 1325 comes from the Community Memorial
dispute, the settlement in that case, as discussed,
constitutes far less burdensome requirements, particularly
the resort to litigation permitted, if not invited, by the
California law. The passage of SB 1325 has been touted by
the California Medical Association as a history-making
recognition of medical staff self-governance and has been
promoted by the American Medical Association around the
country as a model to be followed by other states, but
2004).
84. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2282.5 (Supp. 2005).
85. See Albert, supra note 77. See also New California Law Permits Medical
Staffs to Sue Hospitals, HEALTH CARE UPDATE (Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P.,
Houston, TX), Oct. 7, 2004.
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whether it can roll back the clock, and alter the market-
driven changes in hospital-physician relationships remains
to be seen.
Hospital boards, as noted, have resorted to using
arguments that reinforce their economic fiduciary duty in
disputes with physicians over business-related decisions
impacting medical practice. Recently, however, the hospital
lobby has been very actively engaged in fighting the growth
of niche providers sponsored, in whole or part, by physician
investors who retain privileges in general hospitals. As
noted, the general hospital lobby sees the growth of niche
providers generally as a form of "cherry picking" that will
result in leaving traditional hospitals with unprofitable
patients and services, further straining a troubled industry.
Although it can be argued that such entities spark healthy
competition and may be catalysts to spark improvements in
community hospitals, such a view is far a field from that of
the community hospital lobby. The acute care industry has
proceeded on three fronts to combat the growth of
competing niche entities, and like the medical lobby's
strategies, these efforts are highly protectionist in nature.
At the federal level the industry has succeeded in
influencing the enactment of legislation in the Medicare
Modernization Act, which places an 18-month moratorium
on the use of the whole hospital exception.8 6 The whole
hospital exception is one that applies to the ban on self-
referrals under the Stark II law, allowing physicians to
make patient referrals to institutions in which they have an
investment interest, a practice that is on its face illegal
under the Stark II law. The federal advisory agency, Med-
pac, has recommended that the 18-month moratorium be
extended, and the hospital industry is lobbying to make the
ban on referrals to specialty hospitals by investor
physicians permanent.8 7 The moratorium, however, fails to
touch physicians who are indirect investors in specialty
hospitals, but even here, hospitals have sought to restrict
privileges as demonstrated by a current lawsuit in
86. Medicare Program; Physicians' Referrals to Health Care Entities With
Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II); 69 Fed. Reg. 16,053 (Mar.
26, 2004) (interim final rule).
87. MEDPAC, Report to Congress: Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals,
Executive Summary 4 (Mar. 2005)
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Arkansas.88 The second strategy being pursued to restrict
niche providers deals with recalibrating reimbursement
formulas and reducing payments for outpatient services,
such as ambulatory surgery centers and other niche
providers, making them less attractive as investment
vehicles.8 9 Thirdly, in some jurisdictions state certificate of
need laws (CON) have been expanded to specialty hospitals
and niche providers, and in one state currently debating the
future of CON, it appears that the primary justification for
retaining such a law is to protect the interests of
community hospitals against the encroachment of specialty
providers. 90
TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP
At best the winners in the ongoing economic disputes
between physicians and hospitals achieve pyrrhic victories.
Hospitals that merely approach medical staff issues from a
strict economic vantage point, or go so far as to actually
take punitive measures against staff members whose
practices compete with the institution, risk alienation of
their medical staffs, and chart courses that could be
counterproductive over the long term. Physicians, on the
other hand, who invest in competing niche providers to
which they channel well-reimbursed patients, may
seriously jeopardize the fiscal health of the community
88. Michael Romano, Round 3: Doc Privileges Fight Heating Up; Lawsuit in
Arkansas, MODERN HEALTHCARE 10 (Feb. 16, 2004).
89. MEDPAC, supra note 87 at Executive Summary 4, in which Medpac
argues for changing reimbursement formulas in the context of niche providers.
For a general discussion of how the federal government regulates the area of
ambulatory surgery as a case in point of the extent of leverage the federal
regulators have over this area see Scott Becker & Amber McGraw Walsh, An
Overview Of Federal Laws And Regulations Governing Ownership in and
Reimbursement For Ambulatory Surgical Centers, HEALTH CARE L. MONTHLY,
Feb. 2005, at 3. Related to reimbursement are changes in the scope of
procedures authorized by the feds which clearly have a dramatic impact on
specialty providers as well; see David Glendinning, Physicians Blast Medicare
Plan to Curb Surgery Center Procedures, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2005), at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/ 01/14/gvsa0214.htm.
90. C. Lynn Fitzgerald, Certificate of Need Reinstatement, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS
DIGEST (Dec. 2004), at http://www.physiciansnews.comlcover/1204.html; see also
Illinois Hospital Association, Report of the 2004 IHA Blue Ribbon Panel on
Certificate of Need- The Problem: Access to Essential Health Care in Jeopardy
(Jan. 2005), at http://www.ihatoday.org/issues/cert_of_needblueribbonrep.pdf.
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hospitals where they are on staff. From a fundamental
standpoint a hospital in which the medical staff is out of
sync with the two other core parts, board and
administration, is an organization whose effectiveness is
compromised. Large current challenges, such as ongoing
regulatory compliance, marketplace competition, and
patient safety, cannot be dealt with efficiently in hospital
environments in which the board/administration and the
medical staff are working at cross purposes. In light of the
profound internal and external changes and fiscal pressures
faced by hospitals, and the straining relationships with
physicians, it seems reasonable to argue that the
traditional structure tripartite of the general hospital
should be reshaped, in particular as it involves the hospital-
medical staff relationship.
OBSERVATIONS
Before positing a model for reshaping the internal
relationships of the hospital tripartite structure, three
observations need to be made that flow from the prior
discussion in this article. First, it seems clear that health
care delivery will continue to be based on a free market
system, and as such, competition with all its idiosyncrasies,
is not likely to abate.91 Both hospitals and doctors will be
forced to cope with increased financial pressures that will
test mutual loyalties and cause further restructuring of the
delivery system. Such restructuring will, in fact, be a sort of
constant reality as competitive forces in the health care
marketplace will be such that not all new ventures will
succeed, causing further reconfiguration, as already seen in
the world of niche provider entities. 92
Secondly, technology will continue to evolve in ways
that will allow more hospital-based services to be either
relocated outside of the inpatient setting, or to be
configured in new and novel ways. While a certain degree of
programmatic centralization will be present in the
traditional hospital setting, what is considered the core
compliment of inpatient services is likely to undergo
frequent change with technological innovations. It seems




reasonable to predict that more and more inpatient care
will be delivered in physician office settings, and that the
development of such services will outpace regulatory
control. Hospitals, in turn, will not only be the providers of
inpatient and expanding out patient services, but may enter
into the medical equipment business, leasing various
technologies and space to medical staff members. It is
possible to envision a scenario in which hospitals are
structured as a type of medical mall, combining a series of
core services with a range of specialty offerings, each of
which may have a different ownership model.93 At the
extreme, it is possible to conceptualize the hospital as a
condominium arrangement in which groups of physicians
have ownership interests in respective departments and in
turn, are contractually bound to the acute care facility.
Thirdly, perhaps the most apparent observation that
can be made in the context of the evolving economic
struggles between doctors and hospitals is that the two
parties cannot easily function without the other. Clearly
this mutual dependency is under stress from the reality
noted, namely that more and more physicians can practice
successfully out of hospital settings due to technological
innovations. Still, a significant number of physicians
require hospital affiliations, regardless of the viability of
ambulatory medical practice, and some doctors, in fact, are
highly supportive of the broader roles of community
hospitals generally. Additionally not all physicians are
entrepreneurial, and even those who are, are generally
dependent on the management skills of laypersons to
oversee their respective ventures. Hospitals, for their part,
are clearly dependent on physicians for provision of services
and referrals, but as this article demonstrates, the need for
doctors exists in certain specialty areas only.94 Also
simultaneous to the growth of outpatient medicine, there is
a growing trend on the inpatient side for hospitals to be
staffed by full time attending physicians, hospitalists whose
practices are focused on the most acutely ill individuals and
93. Kelly M. Pyrek, Empowering Physicians One Center at a Time,
SURGICENTERONLINE (2005), at http://www.surgicenteronline.com/articles/
361featl.html
94. See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Hospital/Physician Partnerships Are Key
to Growth of Market Share, available at http://www.healthcare.pwc.coml
st200305.html (last visited Jun. 2, 2005).
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are totally based in the institution.95 While various
dependencies exist between physicians and hospitals, the
nature of these dependencies appears to be anecdotal, fluid,
and hardly one-sided.
CONFRONTING TENSIONS: ARE THERE SOLUTIONS?
Recognition of the evolution and escalation of tensions
in the relationships between medical staffs, their individual
members and hospitals, and of the points noted in the three
observations above, needs to be followed with a vision of
how physician-hospital relations may be improved. Any
solution must recognize that the respective actors are both
pursuing strategies to allow them to be competitive,
maximize income and hopefully enhance quality, and these
goals will ignite a range of conflicts where matters of
autonomy and economic viability are at issue. To diffuse
tensions between doctors and hospitals compatible
strategies and incentives must be aligned in a way that
both parties stand to benefit from any given arrangement.
Of course, it is unrealistic to assume in highly competitive
delivery markets that the relations between physicians and
hospitals can always be bettered, as competition may
ultimately present insurmountable barriers to long term
cooperation.
It can be argued that the market is such a powerful
reality in American health care that ultimately, together
with technology, it will continue to force a restructuring of
hospitals that will further change relationships with
medical staffs, foiled only temporarily by regulatory
interventions. To a large extent, changes in the hospital
world have occurred naturally via the unpredictable
intersection of the many variables that make up American
health delivery, and the continuing challenge of the
regulators and accreditors is to keep pace with such
changes, and craft new mandates that do not frustrate such
market developments unnecessarily. On the other hand, it
can be argued that health delivery is too important an area
to be left to the vicissitudes of uncertain market forces, and
95. See e.g., Robert M. Wachter, The Hospitalist Movement: Ten Issues to




legal/regulatory intervention are warranted to diffuse the
escalating tensions between physician and hospital.
BLUE SKY, NOTHING BUT BLUE SKIES
Within the confines of an academic article there is a
temptation to throw caution to the wind and recommend a
more radical restructuring of the hospital and its three
parts in order to strike a more workable balance between
administration/board and medical staff.96 For example, an
idea could be posited to abolish the medical staff, making it
a department, and thus pursue a hospital corporate model
that would give management and board full control of the
entity. A very different approach would be to empower the
medical staff by abolishing the lay board system, and in
essence place full control over the institution in the hands
of the medical staff, making it the governing authority with
full oversight over the business and quality aspects of the
institution. Still another possibility would be to reorganize
a community hospital as a joint venture arrangement,
much like a specialty hospital, in which physicians and a
management group would control the facility, and in
structuring such a deal, decipher the respective roles and
responsibilities of medical and administrative parties.
Another idea, as noted previously, would be to convert
hospitals into a collective arrangement of various core and
specialty services, each with separate hospital - physician
arrangements and possibility with distinct ownership akin
to a type of condominium. Any of these proposed ideas
would certainly require major alterations in state and
federal law, as well as changes in accreditation standards
that would pose challenges for public and private regulators
who, to date, have not been overly creative in ways in which
they have approached regulation of this sector. But,
perhaps, the most difficult aspect of effectuating dramatic
changes in hospital structures is to overcoming the strong
opposition of entrenched lobby organizations in both the
hospital and medical worlds who generally seek to promote
their respective interests, usually by maintaining the status
quo.
96. John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital
Corporation: A Call for Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 5 (2004).
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THREE MODEST CHANGES
In approaching the challenges of facilitating a more
cooperative relationship between doctors and hospitals,
three possible changes come to mind, two of which are
relatively modest, and seemingly ought not incur dramatic
opposition and require massive regulatory revisions. First,
the medical staff officers should automatically be given
slots on the hospital board to formally bring these two parts
of the institution together. The physician medical staff
officers on the board would serve as any other trustees, and
as such, assume the full responsibilities of this role, but
could do so in a way that reflects the concerns of the
physicians on staff. If nothing else, this relatively simple
alteration of the board would help to diffuse some of the
communication barriers that separate board/administration
and medical staff. Secondly, hospitals should be required to
have a business development committee (if such an entity
does not currently exist) that can be used to devise short,
and long-term institutional business strategies. The
business development committee should be staffed jointly
by members of both the medical staff and administration.
One of the charges of such a committee would be to draft a
hospital/medical staff development plan that details both
inpatient and outpatient strategies for the institution, with
a strong focus on the physician component on both the
inpatient and outpatient side. Undoubtedly such
transparency may come at a risk, and will not necessarily
deter physician staff entrepreneurial behavior, but such
transparency will, at the least, allow potential problems
with business strategies to be openly discussed. Those
states which retain health planning should require agencies
involved to review the hospital/medical staff development
plans as part of their CON review processes.
Third, the current relationship of hospital and medical
staff member which is captured in the credentialing process
may no longer be an adequate mechanism in which to join
doctor and institution, and should be modified in favor of
express contracts. Credentialing, at least indirectly, has
gone beyond a pure quality review process, and in some
cases has become a mechanism for the institution to apply
fiscal measures to physician assessment, in a world where
the lines between cost and quality are increasingly fuzzy.
Perhaps the most significant change affecting credentialing
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is that an increasing number of physicians, in addition to
being credentialed via the medical staff bylaw process, now
have some type of contractual arrangement with the acute
care institution. The proliferation of exclusive contracts in
specialty areas, together with practice acquisitions, the
growth in the numbers of hospital employed specialists and
now the expanding array of hospital-physician specialty
programs have all contributed to a second tier of
relationships beyond credentialing which bind doctor and
hospital in a different, more business like fashion than
traditional membership in a medical staff. It thus seems
appropriate for all physicians on a medical staff to have an
explicit contract with the hospitals in which they practice to
detail the expectations of both parties in the quality and
business sides of their relationship. Physicians will still
need to go through the medical staff credentialing process,
but that process would be folded into a given contractual
agreement binding hospital and doctor. Protections for
physicians could be built into contracts such as termination
with cause provisions, and requirements for a hearing if
agreements were not renewed, necessitating explicit
delineation of the termination criteria. From the hospital
standpoint conflict of interest policies could be spelled out,
as well as reasonable, limited non-compete clauses for
specialists in whose practices the hospital invests. Unlike
the current ambiguity surrounding questions of whether
hospital corporate and medical staff bylaws constitute
contractual agreements, explicit contracts would avoid such
uncertainties by setting out the terms of the doctor-hospital
relationship, and such agreements could be tailored to fit
individual situations. The presence of explicit contracts
between physicians and hospitals should neither minimize
the need for a medical staff organization as a collective
voice for physician interests, nor, as pointed out, obviate the
role of the medical staff in credentialing and quality
matters, nor alter the fiduciary obligation of the board. It
can be argued that explicit contracts are not only a more
realistic way for hospital and physician to relate to each
other, but can be a catalyst to raise a necessary awareness
of all the variables that impact the viability of the parties.
In a sense moving to individual contracts can be seen as
part of the evolution of the hospital-physician relationship,
and is a recognition that such relationships have reached a
point of development where not all of the necessary issues
(including quality and economic factors) that must be
496 [Vol. 53
BEYOND THE BYLAWS
addressed are reflected in either the hospital or medical
staff bylaws. Undoubtedly the use of explicit contracts for
all medical staff members will be resisted by both
institutions and medical staffs as an erosion of the
traditional tripartite structure, and will necessitate
regulatory changes in areas such as licensure, accreditation
and fraud and abuse requirements. It is unrealistic to
expect that the existence of a specific hospital-physician
contract will ameliorate all disputes (in fact contracts may
spark new disputes), but the current system has only
spawned increasing ambiguities and conflicts and is no
longer workable in the business world of health care
delivery.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
To return to the Nordstrom analogy presented in the
introduction, there undoubtedly will be some who will take
offense to comparing department stores and hospitals,
arguing such a comparison fails to take into account the
complexities and essential needs met by acute care
institutions. Hospitals and the physicians who staff them
provide highly complex and necessary professional services,
and as such, there is a societal need to protect them against
the forces of marketplace that are pushing this sector to
become yet another commercially dominated enterprise. It
can further be argued that a key role of law in this area is
to assist in the preservation and enhancement of medical
professionalism, and one way in which that can be done is
through the protection of the self-governing medical staff.
Medical staffs can be characterized as a vehicle to ensure
that hospitals do not degenerate into collective units of
health services, driven only by business forces such as
competition and related consumer demands, devoid of any
true overall vision or social responsibility. There is, of
course, some merit in the sentiment just expressed, but the
fact is that our society has chosen to provide health care
services in a market setting, and in some fashion, it will be
the behavior of the market that will continue to shape these
services. Government may try on its own initiative, as a
concerned payer, to stem the tide of certain market forces,
or may intervene to alter given market developments in
response to powerful political pressures. Still, with no clear
vision as to how our health system should be structured,
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the primary focus of government policy makers will
continue to be rooted in managing and manipulating health
care financing as a tool to control the delivery system, with
the private market being the forum within which these
policies are being effectuated. It may be overly harsh to
conclude that health care delivery is just a matter of crass
commercialism, but it is also short sighted to argue that the
world in which the hospital structure evolved, with its
internal tripartite arrangement, is still a current reality.
Technology, regulation, and competition have all brought
about changes in medical practice and in hospital
operations that will only continue to evolve in new and
unpredictable ways, and will move physicians and hospitals
in different directions. The current controversies spawned
in this new healthcare marketplace, pitting doctors against
hospitals, will not be solved by buttressing traditional
medical staff structures, but can best be addressed by
realigning professional and business interests where
possible through endorsement of more liberalized hospital
structures, and if necessary the eventual dismantling of
traditional arrangements.
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